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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this case, we must decide whether our 2017 decision 
in Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections, 848 F.3d 549 (3d Cir. 2017), applies not only to 
death row inmates who have been granted vacatur, but also to 
death row inmates whose vacatur orders have been stayed 
pending appeal pursuant to local district court rules.  In other 
words, we must determine whether the fact that a Pennsylvania 
state inmate received habeas relief in federal court, and is 
thereby subject to local rules, means that that inmate does not 
have a procedural due process right in avoiding continued 
indefinite solitary confinement.  We decide that Williams 
governs this case and now hold that the existence of a stay does 
not extinguish procedural due process rights. 
 
We are also asked to decide whether thirty-three years 
of solitary confinement may violate the Eighth Amendment.  
We answer this question in the affirmative.  We acknowledge, 
as we must, that the claimed Eighth Amendment right here has 
not been clearly established.  Further, we hold that 
representatives of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
are entitled to qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment 
claim.  We will therefore reverse and remand in part and affirm 









A. Procedural Background 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant Ernest Porter was convicted of 
murder in the first degree and sentenced to death in the 
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas in 1986.  Since 
then, he has been incarcerated in the Pennsylvania Capital Case 
Unit (“the CCU”).  He is currently housed at SCI Greene.   
 
After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on 
direct appeal, Porter filed a Pennsylvania Post Conviction 
Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition in state court.  It was denied.  But 
on June 26, 2003, a federal district court in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania granted, in part, Porter’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
petition.  Most important, as relates to the present appeal, the 
District Court granted Porter relief regarding his sentence after 
determining that his penalty phase verdict form was 
unconstitutional.  The District Court’s order vacated Porter’s 
death sentence and required the Commonwealth to conduct a 
new sentencing hearing within 180 days.  Finally, the District 
Court stated that this order would be stayed if either side 
appealed: “[I]f either Petitioner or Respondents file an appeal 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the 
entry of this Order will be stayed pursuant to Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania Local Rule 9.4(12) pending the disposition of 
that appeal.”  Porter v. Horn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 278, 365 (E.D. 
Pa. 2003).  Local Rule 9.4(12) provides: “If a certificate of 
appealability is granted, the court must state the issues that 
merit the granting of a certificate and must also grant a stay 
pending disposition of the appeal, except as provided in 28 





 Both Porter and the Commonwealth appealed to the 
Third Circuit, and the District Court’s order was stayed.  On 
February 7, 2007, we granted Porter’s motion to temporarily 
hold the appeals in abeyance while the Pennsylvania courts 
adjudicate another PCRA petition that Porter has filed.  We 
ordered the parties to file periodic status reports every sixty 
days.  Because the Pennsylvania courts have not resolved that 
petition, the Third Circuit appeals remain in abeyance.  The 
parties last filed a status report on June 30, 2020.  Porter v. 
Horn et al., ECF No. 03-9006 (3d Cir. June 30, 2020).  
 
 Porter filed the case before us in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania on June 12, 2017.  He was initially pro se, but 
subsequently obtained counsel.  See Porter v. Penn. Dep’t of 
Corrs., 2:17-cv-763, ECF Nos. 1, 28-31.  In his suit, Porter 
argued that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments by continuing to confine him on 
death row even though his death sentence had been vacated.  
He requested damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory 
relief.  Defendants denied these claims and argued that they 
were entitled to qualified immunity.   
 
 Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and 
Porter filed a partial motion for summary judgment.  The 
Magistrate Judge granted Defendants’ motion.1  The 
Magistrate Judge decided that: 1) Williams does not give Porter 
a procedural due process interest in avoiding solitary 
confinement because Porter’s death sentence remains active; 
2) Porter has not offered evidence of actual injury or 
 
1 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the 
Magistrate Judge.  See Porter v. Penn. Dep’t of Corrs., 2:17-




Defendants’ deliberate indifference so he cannot succeed on an 
Eighth Amendment claim; and 3) Porter cannot make a 
substantive due process claim based on the same allegations at 
issue in his Eighth Amendment claim.  The Magistrate Judge 
did not reach the merits of Defendants’ qualified immunity 
defense.   
 
B. Factual Background 
 
 Porter has been in solitary confinement on death row for 
more than thirty-three years.  The Magistrate Judge 
summarized the conditions that Porter is subjected to daily as 
follows: 
 
Cells in the CCU are no larger than 7 feet by 12 
feet, and are closed with a door that has two 
narrow vertical windows, measuring 5 ½ inches 
wide and 36 inches long.  The permanent fixtures 
in Porter’s cell include a metal bed with a plastic 
mattress, a sink, toilet and desk. 
 
As a CCU inmate, Porter spends the 
overwhelming majority of his time in his cell, 
including eating his meals alone.  Porter is 
permitted to leave his cell for ten hours per week, 
two hours per day Monday through Friday.  This 
includes time for basic hygiene, three showers 
per week, and for work duty.  In addition, Porter 
is permitted to exercise in the open air five days 
per week.  CCU exercise cages are no more than 
twice the size of a typical CCU cell, and one or 
two men are placed in an exercise area at the 




personal visit per week, and three telephone calls 
per week.  In addition, unless Porter specifically 
requests a mental health appointment, any 
medical or mental health consultations take place 
through his cell door, within listening range of 
prisoners in the surrounding cells.  
 
On the occasions when Porter is permitted to 
leave his cell, he must undergo a visual strip 
search, and is handcuffed from behind, or 
handcuffed in front using a belt and tether.  Job 
assignments are limited to janitorial duties on the 
CCU block, and performed in confined small 
spaces under close observation and monitoring.  
CCU prisoners are permitted in-cell study, using 
personal workbooks and reading material, but 
are otherwise precluded from participation in 
adult basic education courses, vocational 
learning opportunities or the chance to work 
towards a high school diploma. In addition, 
Porter is not permitted to attend religious 
services with the general population, but may 
receive a daily visit from a religious leader, for 
discussions through the narrow windows of his 
door.  
 
Porter v. Penn. Dep’t of Corrs., 2018 WL 5846747, at *3–4 
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2018) (internal record citations omitted).  
The parties agree that Porter has been subjected to these 
conditions throughout his confinement.  It is also uncontested 
that Porter has not received any disciplinary infractions during 




to challenge his placement in solitary confinement or to earn 
any additional privileges.   
 
 In his Complaint, Porter alleged that his solitary 
confinement has caused “irreversible damage” to his mental 
health.  JA 41.  More specifically, he alleged that the effects of 
his solitary confinement include “severe anxiety, depression, 
panic, paranoia, bipolar mood swings, and at sometimes [sic] 
suicidal impulses.  Plaintiff regularly takes depression 
medication.”  JA 41.  
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Porter’s 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction over Porter’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
conduct a plenary review of the grant of summary judgment.  
See Williams, 848 F.3d at 557.  Summary judgment should 
only be granted where the record shows that “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
We draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.  




 Porter argues that his thirty-three year incarceration in 
solitary confinement violates his procedural due process, 
Eighth Amendment, and substantive due process rights.  He 
has brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  “To state a claim 
under § 1983, a plaintiff [(1)] must allege the violation of a 
right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, 




committed by a person acting under color of state law.”  West 
v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citing Parrat v. Taylor, 451 
U.S. 527, 535 (1981)).  Defendants argue that they have not 
violated Porter’s constitutional rights and that they are entitled 
to qualified immunity because the rights at issue were not 
clearly established.   
 
Because we are mindful that “it is often appropriate and 
beneficial to define the scope of a constitutional right” to 
“promote[] the development of constitutional precedent” 
before deciding whether the right was clearly established, we 
will begin by evaluating whether Defendants have violated 
Porter’s constitutional rights.  Williams, 848 F.3d at 558 
(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). 
 
A. Procedural Due Process 
 
Porter first argues that, according to our precedent in 
Williams, Defendants have violated his procedural due process 
rights by keeping him in solitary confinement for thirty-three 
years without any regular, individualized determination that he 
needs to be in solitary confinement, even though he has been 
granted a resentencing hearing.  We agree.  
 
“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or 
property . . . . A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution 
itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty,’ or 
it may arise from an expectation or interest created by state 
laws or policies.”  Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 
(2005) (internal citations omitted).  “To establish [a state-
created liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment] in 




a showing that the alleged liberty interest is substantial.  To rise 
to the level of a liberty interest, the right alleged must confer 
‘freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and 
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life.’”  Williams, 848 F.3d at 559 (quoting 
Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997)) (alteration 
and emphasis in original).   
 
Williams governs Porter’s procedural due process 
claim.  In Williams, we held that inmates who have been 
granted resentencing hearings have a due process liberty 
interest in avoiding indefinite detention in solitary 
confinement.  Id. at 559–65.  Given the scientific consensus on 
the severe detrimental impacts of prolonged solitary 
confinement, we decided that the plaintiffs’ indefinite 
placements on death row constituted extreme deprivation and 
that these conditions were atypical in comparison with 
conditions in the general prison population.  Id.  We held that 
the employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
(the “DOC”) had violated the plaintiffs’ procedural due 
process rights by keeping them in solitary confinement after 
their death sentences were vacated without any individualized 
determinations that would justify such extreme deprivations.2  
Id. 
 
2 In Williams, we did not decide whether inmates who 
have not been granted resentencing hearings and vacatur have 
a procedural due process interest in avoiding continued solitary 
confinement.  See Williams, 848 F.3d at 552 n.2 (stating that 
the Court “take[s] no position on whether any inherent risk 
posed by inmates whose death sentences are still active and 
viable is sufficient to raise a presumption that their continued 




The plaintiffs in Williams were, like Porter, originally 
sentenced to death in Pennsylvania state court.  They were 
granted vacatur of their death sentences and resentencing 
hearings on PCRA review.  However, the Pennsylvania courts 
denied their challenges to their underlying convictions.  The 
plaintiffs appealed those denials.  Their resentencing hearings 
were delayed while these appeals were pending.  Because there 
was a possibility that they could be resentenced to death, the 
DOC kept the Williams plaintiffs in the CCU.  This decision to 
maintain their solitary confinement pending resentencing was 
the basis for their procedural due process challenge.  
 
Here, we are tasked with applying Williams.  Porter’s 
circumstances are analogous to those of the Williams plaintiffs.  
He too received a resentencing hearing in post-conviction 
review.  Like the Williams plaintiffs, he appealed the district 
court’s denial of relief on his guilt-phase habeas claims.  His 
resentencing has similarly been delayed pending resolution of 
the appeals.  Moreover, he has spent significantly more time in 
solitary confinement than the Williams plaintiffs.  He has spent 
thirty-three years total in the CCU, sixteen of which were after 
he was granted relief in the habeas proceedings.  
 
We are mindful that there are some distinctions between 
the Williams plaintiffs and Porter.  In the view of Defendants, 
the most significant difference is that the Commonwealth 
appealed the District Court’s vacatur order; it did not do so in 
the cases of the Williams plaintiffs.  In addition, since Porter 
 
today.  Porter does not have an “active and viable” death 
sentence; like the Williams plaintiffs, he has been granted 
vacatur and a resentencing hearing but is languishing in 




was granted habeas relief in federal court (rather than through 
PCRA proceedings in state court), an EDPA local rule stayed 
the vacatur order pending the resolution of the appeals.   
 
But we do not think that these differences distinguish 
Porter for the purposes of his procedural due process rights.  In 
Williams, we specifically held that the procedural due process 
right attaches for death row inmates whose sentences have 
been “vacated,” which we defined as “situations where a 
defendant has initially been sentenced to death, but has 
subsequently been granted a new sentencing hearing.”  Id. at 
553 n.4.  This describes Porter’s circumstances precisely: like 
the Williams plaintiffs, Porter was initially sentenced to death, 
but he has been granted a new sentencing hearing.   
 
We are unconvinced by the Magistrate Judge’s reliance 
on the Supreme Court’s articulation of the legal impact of a 
stay in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009).  In Nken, an 
immigration case, the Court held that traditional stay factors 
govern a court of appeals’ authority to stay an alien’s removal 
pending judicial review.  Explaining the distinction between a 
stay and an injunction, the Court stated that “[a] stay does not 
make time stand still, but does hold a ruling in abeyance to 
allow an appellate court the time necessary to review it.”  Id. 
at 421.  A stay pending appeal “temporarily suspend[s] the 
source of the authority to act—the order or judgment in 
question” and “suspend[s] judicial alteration of the status quo.”  
Id. at 428–29.3   
 
3 Our dissenting colleague characterizes our 
disagreement with the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on the stay 
as an “assertion that the habeas court’s stay of the vacatur order 




That the order granting Porter vacatur and a 
resentencing hearing is stayed does not mean that the order has 
no legal import or that Porter currently has a viable death 
sentence.  Porter, like the Williams plaintiffs, is in limbo: he 
may not be resentenced until his appeals are resolved.   
 
Nor are we convinced by Defendants’ argument that the 
Commonwealth’s appeal meaningfully distinguishes Porter’s 
case.  Pursuant to the EDPA Local Rule and the District 
Court’s order, the vacatur and resentencing order would have 
been stayed if either party appealed.  In other words, if the 
Commonwealth had decided not to appeal (as it did for the 
Williams plaintiffs) but Porter decided to appeal his guilt-phase 
claims, the order would still have been stayed.  The 
Commonwealth’s appeal did not result in the stay of the 
vacatur order, and Defendants have not offered any other 
reason why the Commonwealth’s appeal meaningfully 
differentiates Porter’s case from Williams.  
 
We do not see any other relevant distinguishing 
features.  In both cases, the plaintiffs could end up with an 
active death sentence.  The Williams plaintiffs could have been 
resentenced to death in their resentencing hearings, at which 
point the DOC would have returned them to the CCU.  Indeed, 
 
actually vacated.”  Dissenting Op. at 5.  Not so.  The stay 
certainly has legal effect: as a result of the stay, Porter cannot 
be resentenced.  But the stay does not mean that Porter, for 
purposes of his procedural due process rights, is identical to 
other death row inmates who have never received any relief 
and have no imminent prospect of resentencing.  Like the 
Williams plaintiffs, Porter has received relief—that relief is 




as described above, this was the Department’s argument for 
keeping the Williams plaintiffs on death row: the Department 
argued that it was not permitted to remove the plaintiffs from 
death row until their death sentences had “actually been 
modified,” which they had not, since it was possible that they 
would again receive the death penalty in their resentencing 
hearing.  949 F.3d at 557.  We rejected that argument in 
Williams.  Like the Williams plaintiffs, Porter could ultimately 
return to death row either as a result of his resentencing hearing 
or if the Third Circuit reverses the grant of habeas relief.  A 
possible return to death row, therefore, does not distinguish 
Porter from Williams. 
 
Nor can the difference be that Porter’s resentencing has 
been delayed while other litigation in his case remains pending, 
for that was also true of the Williams plaintiffs.  Their 
resentencing hearings were delayed six and eight years 
respectively during their appeals.  The Commonwealth is 
presented with the same prolonged uncertainty about Porter’s 
ultimate sentence that it experienced with the Williams 
plaintiffs.  Nevertheless, extended delays and the attendant 
uncertainty do not justify Porter’s continued solitary 
confinement without review.   
 
Nor have Defendants identified any penological need 
for solitary confinement for Porter or inmates in Porter’s 
position that do not apply to the Williams plaintiffs.  In 
particular, the Commonwealth’s stated interest in keeping 
inmates with death sentences in solitary confinement because 
they pose an increased safety risk is as applicable to the 
Williams plaintiffs as to Porter.  These inmates may or may not 
end up back on death row after resentencing and/or disposition 




have “nothing left to lose” and are therefore more dangerous, 
that concern was as true of the Williams plaintiffs.  On the flip 
side, Porter is as likely as the Williams plaintiffs to be on good 
behavior since he could be resentenced to a lesser penalty.  
 
Finally, to the extent that Defendants contend that 
Porter is responsible for the delays in his resentencing, we 
squarely rejected such an argument in Williams.  There too the 
Commonwealth argued that, by filing their appeals, the 
plaintiffs were responsible for their continued incarceration on 
death row.  We found this argument “both meritless and 
disappointing.  Plaintiffs’ exercise of their rights to appellate 
review is simply irrelevant to our assessment of the 
constitutionality of their conditions of confinement.”  
Williams, 848 F.3d at 561 n.2.  The same reasoning applies to 
Porter’s decision to exercise his state PCRA rights in state 
court.  Porter’s exercise of his rights (and the Commonwealth’s 
exercise of its right to appeal) do not bear on our procedural 
due process analysis.   
 
Our decision is thus a straightforward application of 
Williams.  As in Williams, Defendants must provide Porter 
with “regular and meaningful review of [his] continued 
placement on death row,” including “a statement of reasons for 
the continued placement,” “meaningful opportunity to respond 
to the reasons provided,” and a hearing.  Williams, 848 F.3d at 
576 (emphasis omitted).4 
 
4 Porter makes an alternative claim that, even if 
Williams does not apply, his individual term of solitary 
confinement constitutes an atypical and significant hardship 
that gives rise to a due process liberty interest regardless of the 




B. Eighth Amendment 
 
 Porter also argues that Defendants violated his Eighth 
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment by subjecting him to solitary confinement for 
thirty-three years.  Notably, Porter is not making a broader 
claim that the conditions for all death row inmates violate the 
Eighth Amendment; he makes only an as-applied challenge 
based on his own conditions of confinement.5   
 
 The Magistrate Judge denied Porter’s Eighth 
Amendment claim on the ground that Porter had failed to 
establish that “both Defendants were individually aware that 
Porter suffered a substantial risk of harm and yet were 
deliberately indifferent.”  Porter, 2018 WL 5846747, at *14.  
The Magistrate Judge found that Porter did not provide any 
 
Williams squarely governs Porter’s case, we will not reach this 
argument.  
  
5 Our dissenting colleague takes issue with Porter’s 
articulation of his Eighth Amendment claim and argues that 
Porter is not, in fact, making an as-applied challenge, but is 
rather repackaging his procedural due process claim.  
Dissenting Op. at 12.  But Porter clearly articulated the 
duration and severity of his individual circumstances in 
solitary confinement in his complaint.  Moreover, at the time 
of the drafting of the complaint, Porter was pro se, and “[t]he 
obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings is 
well-established.”  Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  We are therefore unconvinced that his Eighth 
Amendment claim is “analytically identical to his procedural 




evidence of his “alleged mental decomposition” or that “either 
of the Defendants were aware that the care afforded or 
available was insufficient so as to place Porter at risk of further 
decline.”  Id.  We disagree.  
 
 To determine whether prison officials have violated the 
Eighth Amendment, we apply a two-prong test: (1) the 
deprivation must be “objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison 
official’s act or omission must result in the denial of the 
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”; and (2) the 
prison official must have been “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to 
inmate health or safety.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 
834 (1994) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
An official is deliberately indifferent if he “knows of and 
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”  Id. at 
837.  Whether conditions constitute “cruel and unusual 
punishment” is measured against “the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”  Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).   
 
1. Whether Porter’s Deprivations Were Sufficiently 
Serious 
 
 To satisfy the objective prong of this test “the inmate 
must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a 
substantial risk of serious harm.”  Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Farmer, 
511 U.S. at 834).  “The proof necessary to show that there was 
a substantial risk of harm is less demanding than the proof 
needed to show that there was a probable risk of harm.”  
Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corrs., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 





 The Magistrate Judge did not apply the correct standard 
here.  The Magistrate Judge decided that Porter failed to satisfy 
the objective prong in part because he did not offer evidence 
that he had experienced an actual injury.  See Porter, 2018 WL 
5846747, at *14 (“[N]owhere in the record before this Court 
has Porter provided any evidence whatsoever of his alleged 
mental decomposition.”).  But an inmate need not provide 
evidence of actual injury.  We have specifically held that the 
inmate need only offer evidence that there was a “substantial 
risk of serious harm.”  Mammana, 934 F.3d at 373.   
 
 It is well established in both case law and scientific and 
medical research that prolonged solitary confinement, like that 
experienced by Porter, poses a substantial risk of serious 
psychological and physical harm: 
 
A comprehensive meta-analysis of the existing 
literature on solitary confinement within and 
beyond the criminal justice setting found that 
“[t]he empirical record compels an unmistakable 
conclusion: this experience is psychologically 
painful, can be traumatic and harmful, and puts 
many of those who have been subjected to it at 
risk of long-term . . . damage.” Specifically, 
based on an examination of a representative 
sample of sensory deprivation studies, the 
researchers found that virtually everyone 
exposed to such conditions is affected in some 
way.  They further explained that “[t]here is not 
a single study of solitary confinement wherein 
non-voluntary confinement that lasted for longer 




psychological effects.” And as another 
researcher elaborated, “all [individuals subjected 
to solitary confinement] will . . . experience a 
degree of stupor, difficulties with thinking and 
concentration, obsessional thinking, agitation, 
irritability, and difficulty tolerating external 
stimuli.” 
 
Anxiety and panic are common side effects.  
Depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
psychosis, hallucinations, paranoia, 
claustrophobia, and suicidal ideation are also 
frequent results.  Additional studies included in 
the aforementioned meta-analysis further 
“underscored the importance of social contact 
for the creation and maintenance of ‘self.’” In 
other words, in the absence of interaction with 
others, an individual’s very identity is at risk of 
disintegration.  
 
. . .  
 
As if psychological damage was not enough, the 
impact of the deprivation does not always stop 
there.  Physical harm can also result.  Studies 
have documented high rates of suicide and self-
mutilation amongst inmates who have been 
subjected to solitary confinement.  These 
behaviors are believed to be maladaptive 
mechanisms for dealing with the psychological 
suffering that comes from isolation.  In addition, 
the lack of opportunity for free movement is 




deterioration.  The constellations of symptoms 
include dangerous weight loss, hypertension, and 
heart abnormalities, as well as the aggravation of 
pre-existing medical problems.  
 
Williams, 848 F.3d at 566–68 (internal citations omitted) 
(alterations in original); see also Brief of Amici Curiae 
Professors and Practitioners of Psychiatry, Psychology, and 
Medicine at 1 (“[S]olitary confinement causes substantial harm 
to prisoners’ mental and physical health.  For prisoners subject 
to extreme lengths of solitary confinement, such as Appellant 
Porter here, such harm is inevitable.”).  
 
 We have repeatedly recognized the severe effects of 
prolonged solitary confinement, as have our sister circuits and 
Justices of the Supreme Court.  See Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 
140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that a special assistant to the 
Secretary of the Pennsylvania DOC would be concerned about 
the psychological damage to an inmate after only 90 days of 
solitary confinement); Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 225 
(3d Cir. 2017) (acknowledging the “robust body of legal and 
scientific authority recognizing the devastating mental health 
consequences caused by long-term isolation in solitary 
confinement”); Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 355–56 (4th 
Cir. 2019) (holding that conditions on Virginia’s death row 
violated the Eighth Amendment and noting that “[i]n recent 
years, advances in our understanding of psychology and new 
empirical methods have allowed researchers to characterize 
and quantify the nature and severity of the adverse 
psychological effects attributable to prolonged placement of 
inmates in isolated conditions”); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 
2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[R]esearch still 




on end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price.”); Glossip 
v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2765 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(reviewing literature and stating that “it is well documented 
that such prolonged solitary confinement produces numerous 
deleterious harms”).  This consensus makes plain that a 
reasonable jury could conclude that thirty-three years in 
solitary confinement posed a substantial risk of harm to Porter.   
 
 Porter has also provided competent evidence that he 
has, in fact, experienced severe detrimental effects from his 
prolonged solitary confinement.  In his sworn complaint, he 
stated that “the effects suffered from long-time solitary 
confinement, include, but are not limited to: severe anxiety, 
depression, panic, paranoia, bipolar mood swings, and at 
sometimes [sic] suicidal impulses.  Plaintiff regularly takes 
depression medication.”  JA 41.  We “consider as affidavits 
[Plaintiff’s] sworn verified complaints, to the extent that they 
are based upon personal knowledge and set out facts that would 
be admissible in evidence.”  Revock v. Cowpet Bay W. Condo. 
Ass’n, 853 F.3d 96, 100 n.1 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c)(4) & Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985)).  
The verified complaint was part of the record before the 
Magistrate Judge; Defendants have acknowledged that the 
Magistrate Judge was obligated to consider the verified 
complaint in deciding the motions for summary judgment.  See 
Oral Arg. Recording at 1:00:22-25.  Porter thus provided 
sufficient evidence of both serious harm and the substantial 
risk of harm to survive summary judgment.6   
 
6 In a post-oral argument 28(j) letter, Defendants have 
argued that Porter was required to present expert medical 
testimony to satisfy the objective prong of the Eighth 




 Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing.  
Defendants rely primarily on our decision in Peterkin v. Jeffes, 
855 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1988) to argue that Porter’s solitary 
confinement does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment 
violation.  In Peterkin, we held that a class of fifteen prisoners 
on death row in Pennsylvania “ha[d] not established that the 
totality of the conditions of their confinement constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment.”  Id. at 1022.  Defendants argue that 
Peterkin controls this case. 
 
 We disagree.  Although many of the current conditions 
in the CCU are the same as or similar to those at issue in 
Peterkin,7 there are key differences between the cases.  First, 
 
850 F.3d 526 (3d Cir. 2017), for this proposition.  But Pearson 
was an adequacy of care case.  We held that medical testimony 
may be necessary to satisfy the subjective prong of the Eighth 
Amendment test in such cases: “[W]e think that medical expert 
testimony may be necessary to establish deliberate indifference 
in an adequacy of care claim where, as laymen, the jury would 
not be in a position to determine that the particular treatment 
or diagnosis fell below a professional standard of care.”  Id. at 
536.  This is not the situation here.  
 
7 Death row inmates were housed at two facilities when 
Peterkin was decided.  855 F.2d at 1026.  The conditions varied 
slightly at the two facilities. The conditions similar to Porter’s 
include: confinement in individual cells for approximately 
twenty-two hours a day; cells between sixty and seventy-one 
square feet; showers three times a week or on alternate days; 
telephone calls either once a week or once a month; noncontact 
visits once a week; work programs in the form of janitorial 




Porter is making an as-applied Eighth Amendment challenge 
to his specific conditions of confinement; in contrast, Peterkin 
was a class action making a facial challenge to death row 
conditions generally.  Our decision in Porter’s case would not 
determine that the Commonwealth’s death row procedures and 
policies are facially unconstitutional.  As Defendants 
acknowledged at oral argument, the fact that Peterkin was a 
facial challenge distinguishes the case.  See Oral Arg. 
Recording at 58:48-52.8   
 
only; access to medical and psychological professionals in the 
cells; and exercise either individually or with one companion 
in enclosed exercise spaces.  Peterkin, 855 F.2d at 1026–29, 
1031.  
 
8 Our dissenting colleague disagrees that this posture 
distinguishes Porter’s case.  Dissenting Op. at 14.  For that 
proposition, he relies on Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 
(2019), where the Supreme Court held that in all Eighth 
Amendment method-of-execution claims, including both facial 
challenges and as-applied challenges, a prisoner must show a 
feasible alternative method of execution.  Rejecting Bucklew’s 
argument that he should not be required to show an alternative 
in an as-applied challenge, the Court stated that “classifying a 
lawsuit as facial or as-applied affects the extent to which the 
invalidity of the challenged law must be demonstrated and the 
corresponding breadth of the remedy, but it does not speak at 
all to the substantive rule of law necessary to establish a 
constitutional violation.”  Id. at 1127 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The dissent seems to believe that we are relying on 
a different “substantive rule of law” in recognizing a 
distinction between Porter’s situation and that of the Peterkin 




 Second, Porter has spent substantially more time in 
solitary confinement on death row than the Peterkin plaintiffs.  
The maximum amount of time that any of the Peterkin 
plaintiffs had spent on death row at the time of the lawsuit was 
four years.  Id. at 1029 (“The district court found that some of 
the prisoners had already been on death row for four years.”).  
Porter’s duration of confinement is more than eight times as 
long.  Given the consensus in the research and caselaw that 
prolonged solitary confinement is highly detrimental to an 
inmate’s physical and mental health, that Porter has been in 
isolation for more than three decades sharply distinguishes the 
Eighth Amendment calculus here.  
 
 Third, and finally, the research and caselaw have 
advanced considerably since we decided Peterkin in 1988.  
See, e.g., Porter, 923 F.3d at 358–59 (clarifying that Porter 
does not overrule past precedent because it was decided on a 
different set of facts, including that the plaintiffs in Porter 
introduced expert reports detailing the risks of solitary 
confinement with studies that are more recent than those that 
were available in the prior case).  
 
 
is the same: to satisfy the objective prong, “the inmate must 
show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a 
substantial risk of serious harm.”  Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).  While the class in 
Peterkin was not able to meet this standard based on the 
conditions that affected the class as a whole, Porter is able to 
meet this standard because of his particular circumstances.  
There is no difference in the substantive rule of law, only 




 Because of these differences, Peterkin is not controlling 
here.  Porter has been subjected to more than thirty-three years 
in solitary confinement.  That extreme duration of solitary 
confinement has had severe detrimental impacts on Porter, 
impacts that track the robust and growing scientific and legal 
understanding of the harms of prolonged solitary confinement.  
Viewing Porter’s deprivations according to “contemporary 
standards of decency,” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103, Porter has 
certainly provided enough evidence to survive summary 
judgment. 
 
2. Whether Defendants Knew of and Disregarded the 
Risk to Porter 
 
 To satisfy the subjective prong of the Eighth 
Amendment test, an inmate must show that the prison official 
“knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and 
disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to 
abate it.”  Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 229 (quoting Farmer, 511 
U.S. at 847) (quotation marks omitted).  The inmate “may 
demonstrate deliberate indifference by showing that the risk of 
harm was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or 
expressly noted by prison officials in the past such that 
defendants must have known about the risk.”   Betts v. New 
Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842–43) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).9 
 
9 Our dissenting colleague cites 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 4303 several times, including for the proposition that our 
“entire discussion of the subjective prong is ill-considered.”  
Dissenting Op. at 24.  Under § 4303, the Pennsylvania 




 Defendants have acknowledged the risks of prolonged 
solitary confinement.  In a past case, Defendant Wetzel 
conceded that long-term solitary confinement poses serious 
risks: “Secretary Wetzel agreed that ‘long term’ solitary 
confinement ‘certainly could’ have negative effects on mental 
health and that Johnson’s thirty-six year confinement is 
‘certainly’ considered long term. . . .  Moreover, Secretary 
Wetzel stated that he is familiar with the work of Dr. Haney, 
which sets forth at length the harmful effects of solitary 
 
death in solitary confinement until infliction of the death 
penalty or discharge “[u]pon receipt of the warrant.” 61 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 4303.  The “warrant,” which is issued by the 
Governor, specifies a day for execution “which shall be no later 
than 60 days after the date the warrant is signed.” § 4302(a)(1).  
Once the warrant has expired, however, “it is entirely a matter 
of the Department’s discretion where to house an inmate.”  
Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155, 160 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007).  
According to Department of Corrections’ website, the 
Governor of Pennsylvania has never issued an execution 
warrant for Porter.  See Department of Corrections, Execution 
Warrants/Notices Issued by Governor (1985 to Present) 
https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Initiatives/Documents/
Death%20Penalty/Warrants.pdf (last visited June 25, 2020).  
Moreover, at oral argument, Defendants conceded that if there 
is an execution warrant for Porter that is not listed, it is null 
because the sixty days have run.  Oral Arg. Recording at 48:16-
46. The dissent’s statement that “the citizens of Pennsylvania . 
. . have determined that [Porter] must remain in solitary 
confinement while on death row” is simply incorrect.  
Dissenting Op. at 23–24.  Porter remains in the CCU as a 
matter of the Department of Corrections’ discretion, not 




confinement.”  Johnson v. Wetzel, 209 F. Supp. 3d 766, 779 
(M.D. Pa. 2016) (internal citation omitted).  The record also 
reflects that Defendant Gilmore was aware that Porter had been 
in solitary confinement for more than three decades and was 
experiencing mental health problems: following our decision 
in Williams, Porter submitted a grievance and multiple appeals 
to the DOC, including to Defendant Gilmore.  Moreover, the 
DOC’s representative in this case, Steven Glunt, testified in his 
deposition about “potential decomposition” that affects death 
row inmates as a result of prolonged solitary confinement:  
 
[I]f you put [capital case inmates] in an 
environment where there’s not an opportunity to 
be interactive, stimulate their thought processes, 
to grow . . . they start to decompensate.  And then 
that increases their risk of self harm.  That 
increases their risk of hurting others. . . . 
[Decompensate means] a person who is either 
emotional, physically, or mentally starting to 
withdraw, and they’re starting to reduce their 
interaction with others.  They’re starting to 
literally, from an emotional and intellectual 
standpoint, shut down. 
 
JA 199–200.   
 
  Furthermore, the substantial risks of prolonged solitary 
confinement are “obvious,” “longstanding, pervasive, well-
documented, [and] expressly noted by prison officials in the 
past.”  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (holding that a factfinder can 
conclude that a prison official was aware of a serious risk if the 
risk was obvious).  As we have emphasized, a wide range of 




risks associated with solitary confinement.  Moreover, 
correctional officers have publicly acknowledged these harms.  
As Porter highlights, Defendant Wetzel is the president of the 
Association of State Correctional Administrators (“ASCA”), 
which has published reports about efforts to limit solitary 
confinement.10   
 
 Finally, that DOC policies specifically recognize the 
mental health risks posed by solitary confinement supports 
Porter’s argument that Defendants were deliberately 
indifferent.  In the section on administrative custody (“AC”), 
the policies state: “If the inmate has a mental illness, the PRC 
[Program Review Committee] should explore the feasibility of 
 
 10 See Association of State Correctional Administrators, 
Committees, https://www.asca.net/committees (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2019); ASCA and Liman Center Release Two New 
Reports on Solitary Confinement, Yale Law School (Oct. 10, 
2018), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/asca-and-liman-
center-release-two-new-reports-solitary-confinement; 
Association of State Correctional Administrators & The Liman 
Center for Public Interest Law, Reforming Restrictive 
Housing: The 2018 ASCA-Liman Nationwide Survey of Time-
in-Cell, Yale Law School (Sept. 25, 2018), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/Liman/a
sca_liman_2018_restrictive_housing_revised_sept_25_2018_
-_embargoed_unt.pdf; Association of State Correctional 
Administrators & The Liman Center for Public Interest Law, 
Working to Limit Restrictive Housing: Efforts in Four 







placing him/her into [other treatment units] as an alternative . . 
. .”  JA 101.  “A qualified psychologist or psychiatrist shall 
personally interview and conduct an assessment of any inmate 
remaining in AC status for more than 30 calendar days.  If the 
inmate’s confinement continues for more than 30 calendar 
days, a mental health assessment shall be completed at least 
every 90 calendar days.”  JA 106 (emphases omitted).  As 
Glunt describes, staff working in the CCU are trained with 
“more advanced mental-health observation,” including how to 
recognize symptoms of decompensation.  JA 223.  The DOC 
has thus openly recognized the substantial risk of serious 
mental harm that prolonged solitary confinement poses.11  
 
In evaluating the subjective prong of the Eighth 
Amendment test, we may also consider whether officials “had 
a legitimate penological purpose” behind their conduct.  Ricks 
v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 475 (3d Cir. 2018); see also Wood v. 
Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2012).  The Eighth 
Amendment prohibits punishments without penological 
justification.  See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002).  
As a defense to Porter’s Eighth Amendment claim, Defendants 
argue that they have a legitimate penological justification for 
keeping him in indefinite solitary confinement.  Specifically, 
 
11 At oral argument, Defendants maintained that they 
were not deliberately indifferent because they provided 
enhanced mental health services to CCU inmates.  See Oral 
Arg. Recording at 1:06:39-53.  But the question in this case is 
not whether the mental health care afforded to Porter was 
constitutionally inadequate.  A reasonable jury could conclude 
that Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to the 
substantial risk of serious harm by leaving Porter in solitary for 




Defendants argue that they keep inmates like Porter in solitary 
because capital inmates have “nothing left to lose.”  Answering 
Br. 27.  However, Defendants have not offered any evidence 
about the risk that Porter specifically poses, or any 
individualized argument about Porter at all.  Moreover, the 
DOC witness acknowledged in his deposition that the “nothing 
left to lose” argument is not entirely accurate; he testified that 
death row inmates like Porter have privileges that can be taken 
from them if they break any rules.  It is also undisputed that 
Porter has not had any disciplinary infractions during his 
lengthy incarceration.  We therefore do not find Defendants’ 
argument on this point convincing.  
 
In conclusion, we hold that a reasonable jury could find 
that Defendants know that prolonged solitary confinement has 
serious detrimental health impacts, but that they have 
disregarded the risk in Porter’s case by leaving him in isolation 
for more than thirty-three years.12   
 
12 It scarcely needs saying that, in reaching this 
conclusion we do not “create[] for death-row prisoners like 
Porter a brand-new constitutional right to escape solitary 
confinement,” as our dissenting colleague claims.  Dissenting 
Op. at 8.  To the contrary, our conclusion is based on: (1) our 
well-established case law stating that the standard for 
satisfying the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment is a 
substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the well-documented and 
oft-cited body of research and law recognizing the substantial 
risk posed by solitary confinement of such an extreme 
duration; (3) Porter’s own articulation of the harm that he has 
experienced; and (4) Defendants’ own recognition of the 
substantial risks that prolonged solitary confinement like that 




C. Substantive Due Process 
 
 Porter also argues that Defendants have violated his 
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  We hold that Porter’s substantive due process 
claim is barred under the more-specific-provision rule and 
affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on this 
claim. 
 
 The substantive component of the Due Process Clause 
“protects individual liberty against certain government actions 
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement 
them.”  L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 
2016) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 
U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).  “[T]he substantive component of the 
Due Process Clause can only be violated by governmental 
employees when their conduct amounts to an abuse of official 
power that ‘shocks the conscience.’”  Fagan v. City of 
Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1303 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).  
 
 Porter argues that his thirty-three year solitary 
confinement is conscience-shocking because Defendants have 
subjected him to “extreme social isolation” even though he has 
a perfect disciplinary record and they are aware of the 
psychological and physical consequences of prolonged 
isolation.  Defendants argue that Porter cannot bring a separate 
substantive due process claim because his Eighth Amendment 
claim covers the same allegations under the more-specific-
provision rule.  
 
in solitary confinement or on death row have been subjected to 




 We agree with Defendants.  The Supreme Court “has 
always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due 
process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in 
this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.”  Collins, 503 
U.S. at 125.  Under the more-specific-provision rule, “if a 
constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional 
provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim 
must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that 
specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due 
process.”  United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 
(1997).  As the Supreme Court explained in Whitley v. Albers, 
475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986): 
 
[T]he Eighth Amendment, which is specifically 
concerned with the unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain in penal institutions, serves as 
the primary source of substantive protection to 
convicted prisoners in cases such as this one, 
where the deliberate use of force is challenged as 
excessive and unjustified.  It would indeed be 
surprising if, in the context of forceful prison 
security measures, “conduct that shocks the 
conscience” or “afford[s] brutality the cloak of 
law,” and so violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment, were not also punishment 
“inconsistent with contemporary standards of 
decency” and “repugnant to the conscience of 
mankind,” in violation of the Eighth . . . . [I]n 
these circumstances the Due Process Clause 
affords respondent no greater protection than 
does the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.  
 




We first applied the more-specific-provision rule in 
Betts, 621 F.3d at 260.  There, the plaintiff alleged that prison 
officials violated his Eighth Amendment and substantive due 
process rights by permitting him to play tackle football without 
protective equipment.  We noted that the plaintiff failed to “cite 
any case law for the proposition that he may bring both 
substantive due process and Eighth Amendment claims 
challenging the same conduct” and that his claims about his 
conditions of confinement and the officials’ failure to ensure 
his safety “fit squarely within the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.”  Id. at 261; see 
also Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 246 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(affirming district court’s dismissal of substantive due process 
claims that were parallel to Eighth Amendment claims under 
the more-specific-provision rule). 
 
 Porter submits that the claims are distinct because on his 
substantive due process claim, he is arguing that Defendants 
“have violated that constitutional right by engaging in conduct 
that shocks the conscience irrespective of any procedural 
safeguards, unreasonable risk, or penological purpose.”  
Opening Br. 46–47.  But we do not see a distinction here.  As 
in Betts, Porter’s substantive due process claim challenges the 
same conduct as his Eighth Amendment claim, namely, his 
prolonged solitary confinement.  There are no distinct facts that 
apply only to his substantive due process claim.  We therefore 
affirm the Magistrate Judge’s grant of summary judgment on 









D. Qualified Immunity 
 
 Finally, we must decide whether Defendants have 
qualified immunity from Porter’s constitutional claims.13  
Because the Magistrate Judge found that Defendants did not 
violate Porter’s constitutional rights, she did not reach this 
affirmative defense.  Since we disagree with the Magistrate 
Judge on the procedural due process and Eighth Amendment 
claims we will do so.  See Kabakjian v. United States, 267 F.3d 
208, 213 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We may affirm a judgment on any 
ground apparent from the record, even if the district court did 
not reach it.”).  
 
We apply a two-part test to qualified immunity 
defenses: “We first determine whether a right has been 
violated.  If it has, we then must decide if the right at issue was 
clearly established when violated such that it would have been 
clear to a reasonable person that her conduct was unlawful.”  
Williams, 848 F.3d at 557.  To determine whether the right was 
clearly established, the inquiry “must be undertaken in light of 
the specific context of the case, not as a broad general 
 
13 Porter contends that Defendants have arguably 
waived the defense of qualified immunity on his Eighth 
Amendment claims because they did not raise it in their motion 
for summary judgment.  We disagree.  Defendants did properly 
raise qualified immunity as a defense in their Answer to 
Porter’s Complaint and in their Response to Porter’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment on his procedural due process claim.  
Their Response to Porter’s Motion for Summary Judgment did 
not need to include qualified immunity with respect to the 
Eighth Amendment because Porter did not move for summary 




proposition. . . .”  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001) 
(receded from on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223).  In 
some cases, “a general constitutional rule already identified in 
the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the 
specific conduct in question, even though the very action in 
question has [not] previously been held unlawful.”  Hope, 536 
U.S. at 741 (2002) (quoting Lanier, 520 U.S. at 271) (brackets 
in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
“[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates 
established law even in novel factual circumstances” as long as 
the law gives the officials “fair warning” that their treatment of 
the inmate is unconstitutional.  Id.   
  
We look to the Supreme Court, our Circuit, and our 
sister circuits to determine whether a right is clearly 
established: 
 
In conducting the inquiry into whether a right is 
clearly established, we look first for applicable 
Supreme Court precedent.  If none exists, we 
consider whether there is a case of controlling 
authority in our jurisdiction or a robust 
consensus of cases of persuasive authority in the 
Courts of Appeals that could clearly establish a 
right for purposes of qualified immunity. 
 
Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 
F.3d 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal citations, quotation 








1. Porter’s Procedural Due Process Claim 
 
 Because Porter’s procedural due process rights have 
been clearly established since we decided Williams in 2017, 
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.  
In Williams, we explicitly stated:  
 
Our holding today that Plaintiffs had a protected 
liberty interest provides “fair and clear warning” 
that, despite our ruling against Plaintiffs, 
qualified immunity will not bar such claims in 
the future.  As we have explained, scientific 
research and the evolving jurisprudence has 
made the harms of solitary confinement clear: 
Mental well-being and one’s sense of self are at 
risk.  We can think of few values more worthy of 
constitutional protection than these core facets of 
human dignity.   
 
848 F.3d at 574 (quoting Lanier, 520 U.S.at 271).  
 
We were not alone in reaching this conclusion.  See Isby 
v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that 
inmate who had been in administrative segregation for over ten 
years had a due process liberty interest in avoiding continued 
isolation); Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 531–32 (4th Cir. 
2015) (holding that an inmate who spent twenty years in 
solitary confinement had a due process liberty interest in 
avoiding solitary confinement); Wilkerson v. Goodwin, 774 
F.3d 845, 857–58 (5th Cir. 2014) (denying a qualified 
immunity defense to prison officials on a procedural due 
process claim brought by an inmate who had been in solitary 




reasonable prison official could conclude that continuing four 
decades in indefinite solitary confinement would not implicate 
a liberty interest protected by due process”); Brown v. Ore. 
Dep’t of Corrs., 751 F.3d 983, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding 
that an inmate who spent twenty-seven months in solitary 
confinement had a due process liberty interest in avoiding 
further solitary confinement); Selby v. Caruso, 734 F.3d 554, 
559 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that an inmate who spent thirteen 
years in solitary confinement had a due process liberty 
interest); Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1277–80 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that an inmate who spent more than five 
hundred days in solitary confinement stated a claim for a 
procedural due process violation); Hanrahan v. Doling, 331 
F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming the denial of qualified 
immunity to prison officials on a procedural due process claim 
brought by an inmate who had been sentenced to solitary 
confinement for ten years); Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 
231–32 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that solitary confinement for 
305 days gave rise to a due process liberty interest). 
 
 There is therefore wide consensus that prolonged and 
indefinite solitary confinement gives rise to a due process 
liberty interest for inmates in Porter’s circumstances.  These 
cases gave Defendants “fair warning” that keeping an inmate 
who has been in solitary confinement for thirty-three years on 
death row while appeals of his vacatur order proceed violates 
his procedural due process rights.  Defendants therefore are not 
entitled to qualified immunity as of our decision in Williams.   
 
2. Porter’s Eighth Amendment Claim 
 
 On Porter’s Eighth Amendment claim, however, we 




process rights, Porter’s Eighth Amendment right has not been 
clearly established.  Porter has correctly pointed out that our 
Circuit and our sister circuits have held that inmates can bring 
Eighth Amendment claims based (at least in part) on conditions 
in solitary confinement.  But only one circuit has done so in 
connection with solitary confinement on death row.  Cases that 
challenge interpretation of death row policy and conditions on 
death row are distinct from cases brought by inmates in general 
population subject to solitary confinement.  In Williams, for 
example, we considered whether our decision in Shoats, 213 
F.3d 140, was sufficiently similar to the facts and claims raised 
by the Williams plaintiffs.  We decided that, although Shoats is 
analogous and should have “raised concerns” about whether 
the treatment of the Williams plaintiffs was constitutional, it 
was not sufficiently similar because Shoats was not on death 
row and did not directly dispute the death row isolation policy 
at issue in Williams.  See Williams, 848 F.3d at 572.   
 
 We have not found Eighth Amendment cases with 
sufficiently similar fact patterns, and the cases that Porter cites 
in support of his argument are inapposite.  In particular, 
Porter’s reliance on Palakovic, 854 F.3d 209 is unavailing.  In 
that case, the plaintiff had committed suicide in solitary 
confinement.  He was not on death row.  The plaintiff’s family 
alleged that he had preexisting serious mental health problems 
that the prison had diagnosed.  Even so, prison officials 
repeatedly placed him in solitary confinement.  Considering 
the plaintiff’s particular vulnerability in light of the known 
dangers of solitary confinement, we held that the plaintiff had 
stated an Eighth Amendment claim.  Id. at 225–26.  Although 
the Palakovic decision certainly acknowledges the dangers of 
solitary confinement, that the plaintiff was not on death row 




solitary confinement distinguishes Palakovic from Porter’s 
case.   
 
We similarly find Porter’s reference to Allah v. 
Bartkowski, 574 F. App’x 135 (3d Cir. 2014) (unpublished), 
unconvincing.  Aside from the not precedential status of Allah, 
which renders it useless as precedent, that case focused on 
sleep deprivation and unsanitary conditions in solitary 
confinement, neither of which are at issue in Porter’s case.  Id. 
at 138–39.  Nor are the cases Porter cites from other circuits 
sufficiently on point.  They do not concern death row and, in 
each case, the inmate made specific allegations in addition to 
placement in solitary confinement that gave rise to a potential 
Eighth Amendment violation.  See Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. 
Med. Srvs., 675 F.3d 650, 666–67 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting in 
dicta that the court has previously recognized that prolonged 
confinement in solitary may constitute a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment depending on duration, nature and need for the 
confinement, but dismissing the Eighth Amendment claim in 
the case and noting that past cases involved other deprivations 
in addition to confinement in solitary); Fogle v. Pierson, 435 
F.3d 1252, 1259–60 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that an inmate 
in administrative segregation made an arguable Eighth 
Amendment claim when he alleged that he was denied outdoor 
exercise for three years); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 
(9th Cir. 1996) (an inmate in solitary confinement stated a 
claim for an Eighth Amendment violation based on his 
allegations that he was subjected to a lack of outdoor exercise, 
constant loud noise, bad ventilation, constant illumination, 
poor sanitation, and spoiled food and foul water); Walker v. 
Shansky, 28 F.3d 666, 672–73 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a 
jury could conclude that the plaintiff’s prolonged solitary 




and abuse, including denial of water for up to a week, repeated 
physical abuse, and denial of sufficient exercise time, violated 
the Eighth Amendment); LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 
974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that an inmate made an Eighth 
Amendment claim based on a five day stay in a strip cell, but 
focusing on the fact that the cell was in continuous darkness 
and the inmate was unable to maintain his personal 
cleanliness).   
 
 The Fourth Circuit has held that solitary confinement 
conditions on death row violate the Eighth Amendment.  
Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2019).  But a single 
out-of-circuit case is insufficient to clearly establish a right.  
Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on 
Porter’s Eighth Amendment claim.   
 
 We emphasize, however, that from this point forward, 
it is well-established in our Circuit that such prolonged solitary 
confinement satisfies the objective prong of the Eighth 
Amendment test and may give rise to an Eighth Amendment 
claim, particularly where, as here, Defendants have failed to 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand 
in part and affirm in part.  We reverse the Magistrate Judge’s 
grant of summary judgment to Defendants on Porter’s 
procedural due process claim.  We affirm the grant of summary 
judgment to Defendants on Porter’s Eighth Amendment claim, 
but on the ground that Defendants are entitled to qualified 
immunity because the right was not clearly established.  We 




Porter’s substantive due process claim.  Finally, we remand to 
the District Court to determine damages and declaratory and 
injunctive relief.14  
 
14 Defendants argue that Porter’s requests for equitable 
relief are moot and/or abandoned.  We disagree.  Since the 
“effects of the alleged violation” have not been “completely 
eradicated,” the claims are not moot.  Burns v. PA Dep’t of 
Corrs., 544 F.3d 279, 283 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks 
omitted).  Nor has Porter abandoned the claims.  Porter 
requested declaratory and injunctive relief in his Complaint.  
Defendants recognized that he was seeking injunctive relief in 
their motion for summary judgment.  See Porter v. Penn. Dep’t 
of Corrs., 2:17-cv-763, Doc. 53, at 2 (“As relief, Porter is 
requesting that he be released from the CCU and placed in a 
General Population housing unit.”).  Likewise, the Magistrate 
Judge recognized that Porter was requesting equitable relief.  
See Porter, 2018 WL 5846747, at *5 (“Porter seeks declaratory 
relief.”).  Defendants have not pointed to any evidence that 





PORTER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
The majority incorrectly holds that Porter’s solitary 
confinement violates his procedural due process rights. To 
reach that conclusion, the majority must shoehorn this case into 
the non-analogous holding of Williams v. Secretary 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 848 F.3d 549 (3d 
Cir. 2017). It accomplishes that only by ignoring Supreme 
Court precedent describing the nature of a judicial stay. The 
majority then strides into constitutional territory that the 
Supreme Court and our Court have assiduously avoided—
holding that Defendants likely violated the Eighth Amendment 
by keeping Porter in solitary confinement. For these and other 
reasons, I respectfully dissent in part.  
I concur in part because I agree with the majority that 
Porter’s substantive due process claim is barred by the more-
specific-provision rule. See Maj. Op. 31–33. Assuming for the 
sake of argument that Porter’s Eighth Amendment rights were 
violated, I also agree that Defendants are entitled to qualified 
immunity. 
I 
On April 27, 1986, Theodore Wilson a.k.a. Ernest 
Porter1 robbed, shot, and killed Raymond Fiss at Fiss’s 
Philadelphia beauty shop. Commonwealth v. Porter, 569 A.2d 
942, 944 (Pa. 2012). A Pennsylvania jury convicted Porter of 
first-degree murder, robbery, and possessing a firearm. Id. at 
943. The jury then sentenced Porter to death. Id. In accordance 
with state law, he was placed in solitary confinement. See 61 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4303.2 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Porter’s 
conviction and sentence. It also denied his two subsequent 
petitions for post-conviction relief. See Commonwealth v. 
 
1 State and federal courts have used Wilson’s alias throughout 
all proceedings, and we follow suit. See Porter v. Horn, 276 F. 
Supp. 2d 278, 288 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
2 The predecessor statute to 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4303 was  61 





Porter, 728 A.2d 890, 893 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. 
Porter, 35 A.3d 4, 6 (Pa. 2012). 
In 2000, Porter filed a petition for habeas corpus in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. On June 26, 2003, the District Court granted 
relief with respect to Porter’s death sentence but denied the 
petition in all other respects. Porter v. Horn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 
278, 288 (E.D. Pa. 2003). Porter and the government both 
appealed, triggering an automatic stay of the District Court’s 
order vacating Porter’s death sentence. See E.D. Pa. L.R. 
9.4(12) (requiring the District Court, after granting a certificate 
of appealability in a habeas proceeding, to “grant a stay 
pending disposition of the appeal”). Seventeen years later, at 
Porter’s request, his habeas appeal remains pending in 
abeyance before this Court. So he has continued to live in 
solitary confinement. 
Porter commenced this action in 2017, alleging 
violations of three constitutional protections: (1) his procedural 
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) his 
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment; and (3) his right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment, and the District Court—
correctly in my view—granted Defendants’ motion on all three 
claims. 
II 
The majority holds that Pennsylvania has violated 
Porter’s procedural due process right to avoid continued 
solitary confinement. That holding turns on the majority’s 
insistence that “Williams governs Porter’s procedural due 
process claim.” Maj. Op. 10. But by its own terms, Williams 
does not apply to this case. And without Williams, Porter’s 
alleged protected liberty interest and procedural due process 
claim have no legal support.  
In Williams, the plaintiffs were two Pennsylvania death-
row inmates who were kept in solitary confinement by prison 
officials for six and eight years, respectively, after their death 
sentences were vacated. 848 F.3d at 554. The fact that the 





sentences had been vacated is central to Williams’s holding,3 
and it permeates the entire opinion: Twenty-eight times we 
carefully noted that the inmates were kept in solitary 
confinement after their death sentences had been vacated.  
In the section of Williams concluding that the inmates 
had a protected liberty interest, we emphasized that they 
remained in solitary confinement on death row for years “after 
the initial justification for subjecting them to such extreme 
deprivation (their death sentences) ceased to exist.” Id. at 561 
(emphasis added). Focusing on the indefinite nature of their 
solitary confinement, we said that their “confinement on death 
row after their death sentences were vacated continued for 
years with no ascertainable date for their release into the 
general population.” Id. at 562 (emphasis added). And 
contrasting the plaintiffs with other inmates who were moved 
into and out of administrative segregation for behavioral 
reasons, we observed that they “would still have been relegated 
to death row indefinitely even though they had won new 
sentencing proceedings and were not under active sentences of 
death.” Id. (emphasis added). 
In another section of Williams, we distinguished cases 
holding that capital murder inmates do not have a liberty 
interest that precludes confinement on death row without 
regular review because “those inmates were all confined 
pursuant to death sentences that had not been vacated.” Id. at 
569 (emphasis in original) (distinguishing Prieto v. Clarke, 
780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015); Smith v. Coughlin, 748 F.2d 783 
(2d Cir. 1984); and Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 
1981)). “Accordingly,” we explained, “confinement on death 
row was not a significant or atypical hardship for them. Rather, 
it was expressly within the ‘expected perimeters of the 
sentence imposed.’” Id. (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 
472, 485 (1995)). Because the Williams plaintiffs’ death 
sentences had been vacated, their liberty interests were “not 
 
3 See Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 570 
(3d Cir. 2017) (“For the reasons we have discussed, we now 
hold that Plaintiffs had a due process liberty interest in 
avoiding the extreme sensory deprivation and isolation 
endemic in confinement on death row after their death 





comparable to those of inmates with active death sentences that 
arguably require continued placement on death row.” Id. But if 
the fact of an active death sentence is what distinguished 
Williams from Prieto, Smith, and Parker, then it also 
distinguishes Porter’s case from Williams. 
Finally, in order to dispel any possible ambiguity we 
explicitly cabined Williams’s holding by refusing to extend it 
to “inmates whose death sentences are still active and viable.” 
Id. at 552 n.2. That is, inmates like Porter. 
A 
I belabor this point because Porter’s solitary 
confinement (unlike the plaintiffs in Williams, but exactly like 
the capital murder inmates in Prieto, Smith, and Parker) is 
required by his still-active death sentence. As we noted in 
Williams, when a defendant is sentenced to death and the 
Governor issues a warrant for execution, the Department of 
Corrections “shall, until infliction of the death penalty or until 
lawful discharge from custody, keep the inmate in solitary 
confinement.” 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4303; see Williams, 848 
F.3d at 554. That is, Pennsylvania’s Prisons and Parole Code 
requires inmates with active death sentences to remain in 
solitary confinement until execution or lawful discharge from 
custody, which “would occur when the inmate’s conviction is 
overturned or pardoned.” Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155, 160 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007). Porter has not been executed or 
lawfully discharged from custody. So his solitary confinement 
is not a significant or atypical hardship but fits squarely within 
the “expected perimeters of the sentence imposed.” Williams, 
848 F.3d at 569. 
B 
The majority attempts to fit this case into Williams’s 
holding by asserting that “Porter’s circumstances are 
analogous to those of the Williams plaintiffs.” Maj. Op. 11. In 
fact, Porter’s case differs from Williams on precisely the 
ground that that we took such pains to emphasize in Williams: 
He still has an active death sentence.  
Porter’s death sentence remains active because the 





preserving the status quo. The majority brushes that aside, 
declaring that the stay “does not mean that the [vacatur] order 
has no legal import or that Porter currently has a viable death 
sentence.” Maj. Op. 11. This is pure ipse dixit, and it is 
incorrect.  
In Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009), the Supreme 
Court described the nature and effect of a stay. As the Court 
explained, a stay is not a vague, legally meaningless pause in a 
judicial proceeding. For as long as the stay is in effect it 
“suspend[s] the source of authority to act—the order or 
judgment in question[.]” Id. at 428–29. Although a stay is 
functionally similar to an injunction, they “serve different 
purposes” and are analytically distinct in this important 
respect: The injunction operates in personam, telling a 
particular actor what it may or may not do; conversely, the stay 
“operates upon the judicial proceeding itself” and prevents 
“judicial alteration of the status quo.” Id.  
Here, the status quo that would have been judicially 
altered by the habeas court’s vacatur order was Porter’s active 
death sentence. But because the stay of that order “suspend[ed] 
judicial alteration of the status quo,” see id. at 429 (citation 
omitted), Porter’s death sentence was undisturbed and remains 
in place, uninterrupted, to this day.  
This explication of Nken’s teaching about stays is 
utterly conventional. Following Nken, other circuit courts have 
similarly described stays as “preserv[ing] the status quo,” Al 
Otro Lado v. Wolf, 945 F.3d 1223, 1224 (9th Cir. 2019), 
“suspend[ing] judicial alteration of the status quo,” Veasey v. 
Perry, 769 F.3d 890, 892 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Nken, 556 U.S. 
at 429), and “void[ing] any legal effect from the stayed 
judgment,” Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 2009-
1427, 2009-1444, 2009 WL 7365766, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 13, 
2009) (Moore, J., concurring in the denial of reconsideration) 
(referencing Nken). The majority’s assertion that the habeas 
court’s stay of the vacatur order accomplished nothing, and 
that Porter’s death sentence was actually vacated, is 
unprecedented and flies directly in the face of Nken.4 The 
 
4 The majority’s unconventional stay doctrine also threatens to 





critical distinction between Williams and this case cannot be 
evaded by pretending that the stay of the vacatur order was a 
legal nullity. 
III 
Porter argues in the alternative that even if Williams 
does not apply, his solitary confinement is an atypical and 
significant hardship that creates a due process liberty interest. 
Because the majority holds that Nken does not apply and so 
Williams does, it declined to address this argument. Maj. Op. 
15 n.4. But Porter’s constitutional-liberty-interest argument is 
also a non-starter. 
“The Due Process Clause standing alone confers no 
liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within the 
sentence imposed.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). Therefore, “[a]s long as the 
conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is 
subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not 
otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause 
does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison 
authorities to judicial oversight.” Montanye v. Haymes, 427 
U.S. 236, 242 (1976). So the baseline for a prisoner’s 
allegation of atypical and significant hardship “is ascertained 
by what a sentenced inmate may reasonably expect to 
encounter as a result of his or her conviction in accordance with 
due process of law.” Powell v. Weiss, 757 F.3d 338, 344 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 
In Sandin, the plaintiff challenging his solitary 
confinement did not have a protected liberty interest because 
his detention in a segregated unit “did not exceed similar, but 
totally discretionary, confinement in either duration or degree 
of restriction.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486. But inmates in long-
term solitary confinement may have a protected liberty interest 
if they can show that, but for the discretionary decisions of 
 
Fed. R. App. P. 8, 41(d); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 8.0, 18.0, 110.1, 111.4, 
111.7 (2011). And it invites mischief in proceedings that 
routinely employ stays. See e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) 






prison administrators, they would be in the general prison 
population. Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143–44 (3d Cir. 
2000). Their solitary confinement is thus “atypical” in relation 
to the ordinary incidents of prison life and differs significantly 
from “routine” prison conditions in Pennsylvania prisons. Id. 
at 144; see also Williams, 848 F.3d at 561 (noting that prison 
administrators continued plaintiffs’ assignment on death row 
“after the initial justification for subjecting them to such 
extreme deprivation (their death sentences) ceased to exist”); 
see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 217 (2005) 
(explaining that plaintiffs were assigned to Ohio’s Supermax 
facility upon the discretionary recommendation of a three-
member committee, approved by prison warden and the 
Bureau of Classification, a body of “prison officials vested 
with final decisionmaking authority over all Ohio inmate 
assignments”).  
Porter does not fit within the category of prisoners 
described in Shoats, Williams, or Wilkinson because his 
solitary confinement was not discretionary. His death sentence 
carries with it the statutory requirement that he remain in 
solitary confinement until execution or discharge from 
custody. Because solitary confinement is “within the sentence 
imposed[,]” it is not atypical but exactly what Porter could 
reasonably expect as a result of his death sentence. See Sandin, 
515 U.S. at 480 (citation omitted).  
The majority contends that sixty days after the issuance 
of Porter’s execution warrant, his housing status was left 
entirely to the discretion of Pennsylvania’s Department of 
Corrections. Maj. Op. 25 n.9. That is not what the statute says. 
Pennsylvania law provides that within ninety days after a death 
sentence has been transmitted to the governor, he shall issue an 
execution warrant. 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4302(a)(1). “Upon 
receipt of the warrant, the secretary shall, until infliction of the 
death penalty or until lawful discharge from custody, keep the 
inmate in solitary confinement.” 61 Pa. Cons Stat. § 4303. 
These unambiguous statutory requirements are mandatory; 
they confer no discretion upon the Department of Corrections 
either before or after the expiration of sixty days.  
The Commonwealth Court’s decision in Clark 





rejected the argument that “an inmate convicted of capital 
crimes [c]ould be moved back and forth between the general 
population and the Capital Case Unit, depending upon the 
status of his execution warrant[.]” 918 A.2d at 161. Although 
the execution warrant “is the trigger for moving an inmate to 
the Capital Case Unit” in the first instance, his continued stay 
in solitary confinement is required by statute, not the status of 
the warrant, “which might be signed several times over the 
course of [the] inmate’s post-conviction appeals.” Id. The 
Department has discretion “where to house” the death-
sentenced inmate, but it does not have discretion to remove him 
from the Capital Case Unit altogether. Id. at 160. To the 
contrary, § 4303 specifically prohibits the Department from 
exercising the type of discretion suggested by the majority: 
“Once the governor signed an execution warrant for [Porter], 
the Department was compelled by [§ 4303] to remove [him] 
from the general population.” Id. at 161; see also Lopez v. Pa. 
Dep’t of Corr., 119 A.3d 1081, 1089 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) 
(“[B]ecause the Legislature has specifically provided that a 
capital case prisoner shall be kept in solitary confinement until 
the execution of the death penalty or the inmate’s lawful 
discharge from custody pursuant to section 4303 of the Prisons 
and Parole code, DOC is required to keep [the inmate] in 
solitary confinement.”). 
IV 
The majority also creates for death-row prisoners like 
Porter a brand-new constitutional right to escape solitary 
confinement. In fashioning this new right, it precipitately veers 
into Eighth Amendment territory that we and the Supreme 
Court have avoided to date. Moreover, the majority’s holding 
on Porter’s Eighth Amendment claim is tantamount to a panel 
reversal of our precedential opinion in Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 
F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1988).  
A 
The majority applies the conditions-of-confinement 
standard to Porter’s Eighth Amendment claim, concluding that 
he has satisfied both its objective and subjective prongs. Maj. 
Op. 17. But there are two problems with the majority’s 





prong. Second, his attack on a statutorily required punishment 
cannot meaningfully be analyzed under the subjective prong. 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of 
“cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. It 
applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 
U.S. 459, 463 (1947)). In the mid-twentieth century, the Court 
grafted its “evolving standards of decency standard” from 
death-penalty cases onto “deprivations that were not 
specifically part of the sentence but were suffered during 
imprisonment.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) 
(describing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). 
To succeed on a conditions-of-confinement claim, a 
prisoner must show that the conditions involve the 
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (citation and 
emphasis omitted). We analyze a conditions-of-confinement 
claim using objective and subjective prongs. Id. at 298. The 
objective prong considers whether a punishment contravenes 
“the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society[.]” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 
(1992) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 
(1981)).  
Under the objective prong, a condition of confinement 
(or a combination of conditions) must produce “the deprivation 
of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or 
exercise.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304. Other basic human needs 
identified by the Supreme Court include “shelter, medical care, 
and reasonable safety.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989); see also Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citations omitted) (noting 
that prison officials “must provide humane conditions of 
confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive 
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care,” and that 
they are reasonably safe). The deprivation must be 
“sufficiently serious” and “must result in the denial of ‘the 
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities[.]’” Farmer, 
511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298, and Rhodes, 





Porter does not identify the deprivation of any basic 
human need recognized by the Supreme Court. As the majority 
observes, Porter averred that he has experienced “severe 
anxiety, depression, panic, paranoia, bipolar mood swings, and 
at sometimes [sic] suicidal impulses. Plaintiff regularly takes 
depression medication.” Maj. Op. 21 (quoting JA 41). In his 
brief, Porter characterizes the “single, identifiable human 
need” denied to him as “physical or psychological health, 
social interaction, or environmental stimulation.” Appellant’s 
Br. at 32. And the majority summarizes dicta from Williams 
and other cases describing a purportedly robust scientific 
consensus pointing to a substantial risk of psychological harm 
caused by solitary confinement. Maj. Op. 18–21.  
From these allegations and dicta, the majority concludes 
that Porter has satisfied the objective prong of his conditions-
of-confinement claim. Maj. Op. 21.5 But the Supreme Court 
has not recognized psychological health, social interaction, or 
environmental stimulation as basic human needs in the Eighth 
Amendment context. Neither have we.  
We have, however, rejected a virtually identical Eighth 
Amendment challenge to the conditions of confinement on 
Pennsylvania’s death row. In Peterkin, we held that the totality 
of conditions experienced by death row prisoners—isolation 
for twenty-two hours per day in cells measuring between sixty 
and seventy-one square feet, allegedly causing psychological 
and physical deterioration without penological justification—
 
5 The majority also quotes Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion in Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208–10 (2015), 
and Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Glossip v. Gross, 
135 S. Ct. 2726, 2765 (2015). See Maj. Op. 20–21. To these, 
the majority could have added Justice Breyer’s opinions 
regarding denial of certiorari in Jordan v. Mississippi, 138 S. 
Ct. 2567 (2018), and Ruiz v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1246 (2017), and 
Justice Sotomayor’s statement respecting the denial of 
certiorari in Apodaca v. Raemisch, 139 S. Ct. 5 (2018). But 
those impassioned dissents and statements do not support the 
majority’s objective prong analysis. If anything, they 
underscore the Supreme Court’s long-standing and apparently 
determined refusal to expand the Eighth Amendment as the 





“does not contravene the [E]ighth [A]mendment.” 855 F.2d at 
1032. In reaching that conclusion, we emphasized: 
The primary responsibility for operating prisons 
belongs to prison administrators, to other state law 
enforcement officials and to the state legislature. The 
[E]ighth [A]mendment does not authorize a federal 
court to second guess their decisions nor is it our role to 
express our agreement or disagreement with their 
overall policies or theories of prison administration, as 
long as we find no constitutional violation. 
Id. at 1032–33 (citation omitted). Peterkin remains binding 
precedent,6 and as I explain below the majority’s attempt to 
distinguish it is deeply unpersuasive. The result is a sub silento 
panel reversal. 
 
6 Peterkin fits comfortably within a long line of our cases 
rejecting Eighth Amendment challenges to the use of solitary 
confinement in various contexts. See, e.g., Griffin v. Vaughn, 
112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997) (no Eighth Amendment 
violation when prisoner’s administrative segregation was not 
accompanied by the denial of basic human needs, such as food, 
clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or personal safety); 
Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(“Segregated detention [as discipline] is not cruel and unusual 
punishment per se, as long as the conditions of confinement 
are not foul, inhuman[,] or totally without penological 
justification.”); Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348, 352 (3d Cir. 
1981) (solitary confinement for more than 30 days “cannot be 
considered to trench upon [plaintiff’s] [E]ighth [A]mendment 
rights”); United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 471 F.2d 
1197, 1202 (3d Cir. 1973) (“We have said that solitary 
confinement does not, in itself, violate the Eighth 
Amendment[.]”); Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179, 187 (3d Cir. 
1972) (punitive or administrative segregation did “not clearly 
present the extreme type of situation required to establish an 
Eighth Amendment violation”); Ford v. Bd. of Managers of 
N.J. State Prison, 407 F.2d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 1969) (“Solitary 







First, the majority asserts that Porter is making an as-
applied challenge to his specific conditions of confinement, 
whereas Peterkin involved a facial challenge to death row 
conditions generally. See Maj. Op. 22–23. This argument 
mischaracterizes Porter’s complaint, and, in any event, the 
alleged distinction is constitutionally meaningless.  
The majority’s framing of Porter’s Eighth Amendment 
claim is very different from his actual claim set forth in the 
Complaint. According to the majority, Porter claims that 
“Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishment by subjecting him to 
solitary confinement for thirty-three years.” Maj. Op. 16. But 
in Count IV of his Complaint—the only cause of action 
asserting an Eighth Amendment violation—Porter neither 
attacks any specific conditions of his confinement nor 
mentions his thirty-three years on death row. Nor does he 
complain of the deprivation of a basic human need, which is 
the predicate for any conditions-of-confinement claim. See 
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304–05. Instead, he merely repackages his 
Williams-based procedural due process claim, giving it an 
Eighth Amendment label.  
Specifically, Porter alleges that Defendants violated his 
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing 
“to remove [him] from ‘death row’ as housed in solitary 
confinement once the sentence of death had been vacated.” JA 
44 (Cmpl. ¶ 44) (emphasis added). He further alleges that 
Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by keeping 
him “on ‘death row’ and in solitary confinement despite 
Plaintiff’s sentence of death being vacated . . . .” Id. (Cmpl. ¶ 
46) (emphasis added). The allegations in these paragraphs are 
mostly verbatim restatements of the allegations in Count III, 
the procedural due process claim. See id. at 43 (Cmpl. ¶¶ 34–
36). 
In the paragraphs of Porter’s Complaint common to all 
counts, he avers a number of “well established” conditions of 
solitary confinement—conditions that are the same for death-
row inmates throughout Pennsylvania and virtually identical to 





Peterkin, 855 F.2d at 1026–31 (describing challenged 
conditions of confinement). He then alleges, not that those 
conditions or any combination of them is cruel and unusual, 
but that his continued confinement in such “well established” 
conditions is no longer justified. In support of that allegation, 
he specifically cites and quotes Williams. JA 40 (Cmpl. ¶¶ 13, 
14).  
In short, Porter has not asserted an as-applied 
conditions-of-confinement claim based on thirty-three years in 
solitary confinement. His Eighth Amendment claim is 
analytically identical to his procedural process claim: He 
asserts that it is cruel and unusual for Defendants to keep him 
on death row after his sentence of death was allegedly vacated. 
Indeed, all of the counts in Porter’s complaint sound in the 
exact same Williams-based theory.7 
Even if Porter had asserted a conditions-of-confinement 
claim, it is readily apparent from his complaint and from the 
majority’s sweeping opinion that he does not raise an as-
applied Eighth Amendment challenge. Porter does not 
complain that the Commonwealth’s particular application of its 
death row statute to him has deprived him of a constitutional 
right. And he does not complain that the “well established” 
conditions of solitary confinement in Pennsylvania are 
somehow different for him than for any other death row 
inmate. If, as the majority concludes, Porter’s continued 
maintenance in solitary confinement violates the Eighth 
Amendment, then its holding applies to all similarly situated 
Pennsylvania inmates. There would be no set of as-applied 
circumstances under which their solitary confinement could be 
valid.8 See Const. Party of Pa. v. Cortes, 824 F.3d 386, 394 (3d 
 
7 Even if Williams applied to this case, which it does not for 
reasons I explain above, Porter’s Williams-based Eighth 
Amendment claim is bootless. Williams considered only a 
procedural due process claim and did not undertake any Eighth 
Amendment analysis. That was not an oversight; plaintiffs 
waived their Eighth Amendment claim on appeal. Williams, 
848 F.3d at 553 n.8. 
8 The majority’s only discussion of Porter’s particular situation 
is a passing reference to his conclusory allegations of harm in 





Cir. 2016) (discussing as-applied and facial challenges); 
United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(same).  
Finally and most importantly, even if Porter’s Eighth 
Amendment claims really were as-applied, rather than a facial 
attack on Pennsylvania’s death row statute, it would not matter 
for purposes of the constitutional analysis. “[C]lassifying a 
lawsuit as facial or as-applied affects the extent to which the 
invalidity of the challenged law must be demonstrated and the 
corresponding ‘breadth of the remedy[.]’” Bucklew v. 
Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1127 (2019) (citation omitted). But 
whether a challenge is facial or as-applied “does not speak at 
all to the substantive rule of law necessary to establish a 
constitutional violation.” Id. (citation omitted). “Surely it 
would be strange for the same words of the Constitution to bear 
entirely different meanings depending only on how broad a 
remedy the plaintiff chooses to seek.” Id. at 1127–28 (citations 
omitted). For all of these reasons, the majority’s attempt to 
distinguish Peterkin’s Eighth Amendment holding based on 
the nature of the remedy sought by Porter is specious. 
2 
The majority next attempts to distinguish Peterkin by 
observing that Porter “has spent substantially more time in 
solitary confinement on death row than the Peterkin plaintiffs.” 
Maj. Op. 24. Again, Porter’s Eighth Amendment claim does 
not challenge the overall duration of his solitary confinement 
but only his continued solitary confinement after 2003, based 
on a misreading of Williams.  
In any event, the majority makes no attempt to show 
why Porter’s longer stay on death row is constitutionally 
significant or legally distinguishes Peterkin’s Eighth 
Amendment holding. Because this section of the majority’s 
opinion is no longer tethered to Williams’s procedural due 
process framework, it appears to hold generally—but with 
 
analysis relies most heavily on scientific studies that purport to 
describe psychological findings for all inmates in any type of 
solitary confinement, no matter where they are incarcerated. 





almost no constitutional analysis—that long-term solitary 
confinement is objectively cruel and unusual even for inmates 
serving an active death sentence. See Maj. Op. 24–25. That is 
an unwarranted leap from our Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence in this area, including Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 
F.3d 209 (2017) (finding that prison officials acted with 
deliberate indifference by repeatedly subjecting a mentally ill 
and suicidal inmate serving a sentence for burglary to solitary 
confinement, abusive staff, and inadequate to non-existent 
mental health care), and from any guidance offered by the 
Supreme Court. 
Still, it is indeed troubling that seventeen years after the 
habeas court granted relief with respect to Porter’s death 
sentence and stayed its vacatur order pending appeal, he 
perseveres in solitary confinement and the cross-appeals 
remain undecided. Porter’s habeas appeal was docketed on 
August 14, 2003. Over the next three years, Porter filed eight 
motions to stay or temporarily toll briefing, all of which were 
granted. On November 9, 2006, Porter filed a motion to hold 
his case in abeyance pending the Pennsylvania state courts’ 
disposition of his petitions for post-conviction relief. We 
granted Porter’s motion over the government’s opposition, 
held the case in abeyance, and required a status report every 
sixty days. From April 2007 to date, Porter’s counsel has duly 
filed status reports every sixty days, advising this Court that his 
PCRA petition remains pending before the state PCRA court 
but never asking this Court to resolve his case. At the same 
time, Porter has apparently argued to the PCRA court that it 
lacked authority to rule on his PCRA petition until his federal 
proceedings were completed. The result is that both this Court 
and the PCRA court have held their proceedings in abeyance 
out of deference to each other, creating an exquisite catch-22 
gridlock now approaching two decades. 
In Commonwealth v. Porter, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania recounted the history of this multi-jurisdictional 
procedural morass. That court opined that Porter’s litigation 
“strategy—pursued in both state and federal court—has been 
to avoid having any of [his] collateral claims decided any time 
soon.” 35 A.3d at 15. And in Commonwealth v. Spotz, Chief 
Justice Castille filed a concurring opinion describing in detail 





“assured a de facto, perpetual stay of execution.” 18 A.3d 244, 
347 (Pa. 2011) (Castille, C.J., concurring). The principle of 
comity counsels that we at least respectfully consider the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s writings on a matter of direct 
import to this case.  
Porter asserts that his maintenance in solitary 
confinement after 2003 violates his Eighth Amendment right 
against cruel and unusual punishment. In evaluating the 
temporal aspect of that claim, most people exercising common 
sense would reasonably wonder whether Porter’s own strategic 
decisions may have contributed to his plight. Common sense 
aside, because legal relevance concerns probabilistic 
tendencies and the consequences of one’s actions, Porter’s 
litigation choices and actions are surely relevant to the length 
of his time in solitary confinement. See Fed. R. Evid. 401.  
And because the law assumes that moral actors are 
responsible for their voluntary actions, courts have uniformly 
rejected prisoners’ arguments that delay caused by their own 
extended appeals creates an Eighth Amendment violation. See 
Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998); 
Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995); 
Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 928–29 (4th Cir. 1995); McKenzie 
v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1995); Fearance v. Scott, 
56 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1995); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 
1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1995). So there is obvious merit in 
considering the reasons for delay. 
I wholeheartedly affirm that no litigant should be 
criticized for vigorously pursuing his appeal rights. But 
acknowledging responsibility is different than criticism. And 
the history of this particular appeal is extraordinary, to say the 
least. The salient issue, which the majority avoids, is whether 
Porter—perhaps through less-than-candid maneuvering in two 
jurisdictions—has thwarted this Court’s disposition of his 
appeal precisely because he does not wish to pursue his appeal 
rights. If so, the majority’s argument that Peterkin is 
distinguishable because Porter has spent relatively more time 






Finally, the majority attempts to distinguish Peterkin 
because the “research and caselaw” have allegedly “advanced 
considerably” since that case was decided. Maj. Op. 24. Even 
if that were correct, it is insufficient reason for a panel to 
overrule a decision with which it no longer agrees. 3d Cir. 
I.O.P. 9.1 (2018). But it is incorrect. 
The majority overstates the extent to which caselaw has 
“advanced” in the direction that the majority perceives. The 
Supreme Court has never held that solitary confinement 
violates the Eighth Amendment, and it continues to rebuff 
fervid invitations to do so. See supra note 5. Our Court has not 
held that the conditions of confinement on Pennsylvania’s 
death row are unconstitutional, and we have a long train of 
decisions to the contrary. See supra note 6 (collecting cases). 
And we are not an outlier. “The practice of solitary 
confinement remains unrestrained by the Constitution in just 
about all forms, imposed on just about all groups of prisoners, 
in just about all jurisdictions in America.” Andrew Leon 
Hanna, The Present Constitutional Status of Solitary 
Confinement, 21 U. Pa. J. Const. L. Online 1, 5 (2019). “[T]he 
Eighth Amendment has done little to no work in the area of 
solitary confinement”; indeed, “[i]f there are any true 
substantive limitations on the conditions presented by solitary 
or the length of time that a person may be placed in extreme 
isolation, they have not come from constitutional law.” 
Alexander A. Reinert, Solitary Troubles, 93 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 927, 932, 944 (2018).  
In support of its assertion that caselaw has “advanced 
considerably” since Peterkin, the majority cites one case from 
another circuit, Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2019). 
Clarke was the first and remains the only Court of Appeals 
decision holding that solitary confinement violates the Eighth 
Amendment. See Maj. Op. 38 (“But only one circuit has [found 
an Eighth Amendment violation] . . . in connection with 
solitary confinement on death row.”). But its relevance to 
Porter’s case is limited because Virginia—unlike 
Pennsylvania—did not statutorily require that death-sentenced 
inmates remain in solitary confinement. Rather, the decision 





corrections. See Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-234. Also, the state 
defendants inexplicably waived their obligation to adduce 
legitimate penological considerations justifying the prison 
officials’ discretionary decisions to isolate death row prisoners. 
And the state defendants did this notwithstanding the court’s 
acknowledgement that “a legitimate penological justification 
can support prolonged detention of an inmate in segregated or 
solitary confinement, similar to the challenged conditions on 
Virginia’s death row, even though such conditions create an 
objective risk of serious emotional and psychological harm.” 
Clarke, 923 F.3d at 362–63. One easily distinguishable case in 
another jurisdiction hardly constitutes a sea change in the law, 
so I disagree that the caselaw has “advanced considerably.” 
At bottom, the majority jettisons Peterkin because of 
“scientific and medical research” which allegedly provides 
insight about solitary confinement that we lacked when 
deciding Peterkin (1988), or for that matter Young (1992) and 
Griffin (1997). Maj. Op. 18–21. That seems to me a dubious 
proposition. Long before such research emerged, Americans 
well-understood the baleful effect of solitary confinement on 
some inmates. Alexis de Tocqueville vividly wrote about the 
American practice in 1833,9 as did Charles Dickens in 1842.10 
And in 1890, the Supreme Court pointedly remarked: 
 
9 “This experiment, of which the favourable results had been 
anticipated, proved fatal for the majority of prisoners. It 
devours the victim incessantly and unmercifully; it does not 
reform, it kills. The unfortunate creatures submitted to this 
experiment wasted away . . . .” Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, 
Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of 
Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 477, 484 (1997) (citing Torsten Eriksson, The 
Reformers, An Historical Survey of Pioneer Experiments in the 
Treatment of Criminals 49 (1976) (quoting Alexis de 
Tocqueville and Gustave de Beaumont)). 
10 “The system here, is rigid, strict, and hopeless solitary 
confinement. I believe it, in its effects, to be cruel and wrong 
. . . . [T]here is a depth of terrible endurance in it which none 
but the sufferers themselves can fathom, and which no man has 
a right to inflict upon his fellow-creature. I hold this slow and 





A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after 
even a short [solitary] confinement, into a semi-
fatuous condition, from which it was next to 
impossible to arouse them, and others became 
violently insane; others still, committed suicide; 
while those who stood the ordeal better were not 
generally reformed, and in most cases did not 
recover sufficient mental activity to be of any 
subsequent service to the community. 
In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890).  
Throughout the twentieth century, similar criticisms 
were raised, and political and legal challenges were asserted 
against the use of solitary confinement. Those controversies 
attracted the attention of psychologists and psychiatrists who 
“wrote and testified about the nature, magnitude, and long-
term consequences of these acute negative effects.” Craig 
Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A 
Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary 
Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 477, 491 
(1997).  
So while scientific articles may have proliferated in 
recent years, we have not witnessed some kind of Copernican 
shift in our understanding. The risk of potential harm from 
 
immeasurably worse than any torture of the body: and because 
its ghastly signs and tokens are not so palpable to the eye and 
sense of touch as scars upon the flesh; because its wounds are 
not upon the surface, and it extorts few cries that human ears 
can hear; therefore I the more denounce it, as a secret 
punishment which slumbering humanity is not roused up to 
stay . . . . I solemnly declare, that with no rewards or honours 
could I walk a happy man beneath the open sky by day, or lie 
me down upon my bed at night, with the consciousness that 
one human creature, for any length of time, no matter what, lay 
suffering this unknown punishment in his silent cell, and I the 
cause, or I consenting to it in the least degree.” Eleanor 
Umphres, Note, Solitary Confinement:  An Unethical Denial of 
Meaningful Due Process, 30 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1057, 1062 
(2017) (quoting Charles Dickens, American Notes for General 





solitary confinement (as well as the obvious possible Eighth 
Amendment implications) has long been well-known. More 
pointedly, it was not lost on our Court when we decided 
Peterkin. We described the plaintiffs’ allegations of insanity, 
suicide, lethargy, anger, and psychological deterioration as 
“deeply disturbing” though not unconstitutional. Peterkin, 855 
F.2d at 1033.  
None of the “scientific and medical research” upon 
which the majority relies so heavily was included in the record 
of this case. So this panel has not even seen the relevant studies. 
Instead, the majority simply declares that the risk of harms 
discussed in unidentified scientific and medical research is 
“well established,” citing dicta from other cases and an amicus 
brief. Maj. Op. 18–21. Thus, the evidentiary burden is neatly 
flipped in this case: The substantial risk of harm that Porter 
must show is simply presumed as though it were judicially 
noticeable. 
I believe we should at least attend to the scientific 
research rather than merely accept descriptions of it, sight-
unseen, as settled adjudicative fact. If we did, we may be 
surprised to find that the allegedly robust consensus is a bit 
overstated.  
For example, in July 2015, President Obama “directed 
Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch and the Justice Department 
to review the overuse of solitary confinement across U.S. 
prisons.”11 As part of that review, the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s National Institute of Justice12 issued a March 2016 
 
11 Barack Obama, Opinion, Why We Must Rethink Solitary 




0607e0e265ce_story.html (last visited July 28, 2020). 
12 “The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) focuses on research, 
development, and evaluation of crime control and justice 
issues. NIJ provides objective, independent, evidence-based 
knowledge and tools to meet the challenge of criminal justice, 





paper titled “Administrative Segregation in U.S. Prisons,” in 
which it surveyed the research on the psychological effects of 
solitary confinement and other types of administrative 
segregation as practiced throughout the United States. See  
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249749.pdf (last visited 
July 28, 2020). Here are some of the findings in the NIJ report: 
• “The only clear statement that can be 
made about the body of literature 
assessing the psychological effects of 
solitary confinement is that researchers 
using different methods to study different 
populations have come to different 
conclusions about the psychological 
effects on inmates.” Id. at 16. 
 
• “Although rarely acknowledged, the 
psychological/psychiatric effects research 
frequently relies on a large body of 
literature on the effects of sensory 
deprivation. . . . [I]t is often taken for 
granted that isolation will have severe and 
lasting detrimental effects on the 
psychological well-being of all those 
exposed to it, even though the evidence in 
this area does not always bear out this 
assumption . . . .” Id. n.10. 
 
• “Other respected scholars have also been 
less than convinced by the accumulated 
evidence regarding psychological effects. 
Bonta and Gendreau (1990), for example, 
argued that little evidence exists of 
deteriorating mental health among 
inmates, emphasizing that ‘long-term 
imprisonment and specific conditions of 
confinement such as solitary, under 
limiting and humane conditions, fail to 
show any sort of profound detrimental 
effects.’” Id. at 17. 
 
https://www.ojp.gov/about/offices/national-institute-justice-






• Researchers’ “findings could just as 
easily be interpreted as demonstrating that 
incarceration in and of itself has 
damaging effects on the mental health of 
individuals subjected to it, especially 
initially.” Id. at 18. 
 
• Meta-analytic scholars “found only weak 
effects of solitary confinement on inmate 
outcomes (most of which were 
psychological) and concluded that their 
meta-analytic review did not find support 
for the long-argued contention that 
solitary confinement has lasting 
psychological effects on those subjected 
to it.” Id. at 22. 
 
• Findings from recent meta-analyses “cast 
some doubts about [solitary confinement] 
being as devastating to inmates as has 
often been portrayed in the media and by 
some human rights organizations, 
activists, and scholars who vehemently 
oppose the practice on moral/ethical 
grounds . . . .” Id.  
 
• “After a thorough review of the extant 
literature [on the practice of all types of 
administrative segregation throughout the 
United States], it is clear that, in 2015, the 
answers continue to be few and the 
questions many. It is equally clear that 
when researchers have disagreed, and in 
this area they have tended to disagree 
passionately, they have not always been 
speaking the same language or 
conducting research with equivalent 
populations.” Id. at 23. 
 
• “What is more, for many researchers 
studying solitary confinement, the 





questions but also moral and ethical 
concerns that will persist regardless of the 
breadth or depth of the evidence base. 
Across a literature replete with highly 
charged emotions, interpreting the 
evidence and separating evidence from 
strongly held beliefs have become 
exceptionally difficult.” Id.  
These bullet points are not fully representative of the 
NIJ report. It also finds, for example, that “a substantial body 
of work has established that solitary confinement can have 
damaging psychological effects, particularly when that 
confinement involves near complete isolation and sensory 
deprivation, or when the term of such confinement is 
extended.” Id. at 17. But my point is that the purported 
“consensus” of recent medical and scientific research is not so 
“robust” and univocal as to justify overturning Peterkin, just 
because that case was decided in 1988. At least according to 
the NIJ report, the scientific evidence is ambiguous, contested, 
and ideologically charged. But the majority does not even 
acknowledge the ongoing debate, choosing instead to repeat 
broad, one-sided pronouncements.  
B 
The subjective prong of the conditions-of-confinement 
standard requires a prisoner to establish that prison officials 
acted with deliberate indifference. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302–03. 
A prison official is deliberately indifferent when he “knows of 
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]” 
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The deliberate indifference test is 
thus individualized for each prison official responsible for 
inmates’ care. The majority asserts that Porter has satisfied the 
subjective prong because officials from Pennsylvania’s 
Department of Corrections are aware of risks that accompany 
solitary confinement. Maj. Op. 25–30.  
But Porter has not been in solitary confinement because 
of the discretionary decisions or policies of DOC officials 
acting with the “requisite culpable state of mind.” See Wilson, 
501 U.S. at 297. Instead, the citizens of Pennsylvania, through 





determined that he must remain in solitary confinement while 
on death row. See 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4303. For this reason, I 
believe the majority’s entire discussion of the subjective prong 
is ill-considered.  
As the Court noted in Wilson, Estelle first extended 
Eighth Amendment protections to “some deprivations that 
were not specifically part of the sentence but were suffered 
during imprisonment.” 501 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the subjective prong is inapplicable when, as 
here, the challenged condition is “formally meted out as 
punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge.” Id. at 300; 
see also Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 401 (6th Cir. 
1999) (“All Eighth Amendment claims have an objective 
component, and when ‘the pain inflicted is not formally meted 
out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some 
mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer’ in 
order to make out the subjective component of an Eighth 
Amendment violation.” (emphasis added) (quoting Wilson, 
501 U.S. at 300)). 
The Supreme Court has applied the conditions-of-
confinement standard to medical care;13 disciplinary (i.e., 
discretionary) solitary confinement;14 double celling;15 injuries 
caused by prison guards;16 and injuries caused by other 
inmates.17 None of those cases dealt with a statutorily imposed 
condition of punishment, and for good reasons. The 
impossibility of imputing subjective intention to a collective 
body is well-known. See generally John F. Manning, Inside 
Congress’s Mind, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1911, 1918–21 (2015); 
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: 
Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 239 
(1992). And Wilson makes clear that the subjective prong 
applies only to “Eighth Amendment claims based on official 
conduct that does not purport to be the penalty formally 
 
13 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
14 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
15 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
16 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); Whitley v. 
Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). 
17 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Helling v. 





imposed for a crime[.]” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302. Because the 
majority elides the critical distinction between the 
discretionary acts of deliberately indifferent prison officials 
and the faithful enforcement of a law enacted by the 
Pennsylvania Legislature, its subjective-prong analysis is 
unpersuasive.  
V 
 I agree that Porter’s substantive due process claim is 
barred under the more-specific-provision rule. See Maj. Op. 
31–33. So I concur with Part III.C. of the majority’s opinion. 
VI 
The majority holds that qualified immunity is 
unavailable to Defendants because Porter’s procedural-due-
process right was clearly established by Williams. See Maj. Op. 
36. I disagree for all of the reasons stated in Part II above. 
Rather, I believe the majority has created a new procedural-
due-process right to be free from solitary confinement 
notwithstanding an active death sentence. Because that right 
was not clearly established, Defendants are entitled to qualified 
immunity on Porter’s procedural due process claim.  
VII 
Assuming for the sake of argument that Porter’s Eighth 
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishments was violated, I agree that Defendants are entitled 
to qualified immunity. See Maj. Op. 40. I therefore concur with 
Part III.D.2. of the majority opinion insofar as it holds that 
“Defendants are . . . entitled to qualified immunity on Porter’s 
Eighth Amendment claim.” Id. 
*          *          * 
This opinion explains my disagreement with the 
majority’s opinion and judgment. It is not about the merits or 
demerits of solitary confinement. Whether to use solitary 
confinement at all—and if so, under what circumstances, for 
which prisoners, the specific conditions of confinement, and 
the duration of such confinement—is a policy judgment 





religious or philosophical questions. Such policy judgments 
are reserved for the Legislative Branch18—and the 
Pennsylvania Legislature has made them, at least for inmates 
who, like Porter, have been sentenced to death following a 
conviction of murder. For the reasons discussed herein, I 
respectfully dissent in part from the majority’s opinion because 
I believe it misconstrues the applicable law. 
 
18 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979) (The 
“operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the 
province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our 
Government, not the Judicial.” (citation omitted)); see 
generally Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Structure, Judicial 
Discretion, and the Eighth Amendment, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1149 (2006). 
